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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Evidence-ADMISSmILITY OF EVIDENCE- FRYE STANDARD OF "GEN-
ERAL ACCEPTANCE" FOR ADMISSIBILITY OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
REJECTED IN FAVOR OF BALANCING TEST
United States v. Williams,
583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1025 (1979)
The explosion of technology in this century has spawned a
succession of new scientific techniques with increased capabilities
for measurement, identification, and analysis.' The new
techniques often prove valuable in investigations of complex or
subtle crimes. When the results of new scientific techniques are
offered as evidence, however, difficult questions arise concerning
their potential effect on the fairness of the judicial process. Tradi-
tionally, courts have resolved these questions by applying the gen-
eral acceptance test of Frye v. United States.2 Under this standard,
scientific evidence cannot be admitted unless it has "gained gen-
eral acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." 3  Al-
though courts have widely followed Frye during the last fifty
years, 4 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v.
Williams,5 recently rejected the Frye standard. The court adopted a
balancing test which weighs the probative value, materiality, and
reliability of the scientific evidence against its tendency to mislead
or prejudice the jury.' This Note will examine the utility of the
Frye standard in light of the Williams attack, and suggest that the
I See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1977) (ion microprobic
analysis of hair sample); State v. Spencer, 298 Minn. 456, 216 N.W.2d 131 (1974) (neutron
activation analysis for gunpowder particles on hand); State v. Chatman, 156 N.J. Super. 35,
383 A.2d 440 (1978) ("Flameless Atomic Absorption Analysis" for gunshot residue). See
generally A. MOENSSENS AND F. INBAU, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES (2d ed.
1978).
2 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
3 Id. at 1014.
4 See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 557 (6th Cir. 1977) (ion microprobic
analysis test for hair fails Frye test); United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 166 (8th Cir.
1975) (lie detector fails Frye); United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 745 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(voiceprints inadmissible under Frye standard); Marks v. United States, 260 F.2d 377, 382
(10th Cir. 1958) (lie detector results inadmissible uhder Frye standard), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
929 (1959); People v. Slone, 76 Cal. App. 3d 611, 623-25, 143 Cal. Rptr. 61, 68-69 (1978)
(bite-mark-identification test meets Frye); Commonwealth v. Topa, 471 Pa. 223, 231-32, 369
A.2d 1277, 1281-82 (1977) (voiceprint fails Frye).
5 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1025 (1979).
6 Id. at 1198.
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For a decision which has been widely applied, yet sparked
sharp disagreement, Frye is unprepossessing. The nine-paragraph
opinion offers little discussion of the policy motives that prompted
the court to create a special screening standard for scientific evi-
dence. The defendant in Frye sought unsuccessfully to introduce
the results of a lie-detector test.7 On appeal, the defendant ar-
gued that the testimony of his expert was admissible because "the
question involved does not lie within the range of common ex-
perience or common knowledge, but requires special experience
or special knowledge."" The District of Columbia Circuit did not
reach this contention. The court held that the test results failed to
meet a threshold requirement for the admission of evidence de-
rived by new scientific techniques: "the thing from which the de-
duction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained
general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." 9
Although the Frye court offered little policy justification for
imposing its additional test, later courts have filled in the gaps.
These courts' justifications of Frye fall into two categories. First,
the Frye test helps to ensure that scientific evidence will be reli-
293 F. at 1013-14. The test was described as a "systolic blood pressure deception
test." Id. at 1013.
8 Id. at 1014.
Id. Frye was not the first case to look at the views of scientific authorities when
assessing the admissibility of scientific evidence. See, e.g., People v. Jennings, 252 Ill. 534,
546-47, 96 N.E. 1077, 1081 (1911) (court examined "standard authorities on scientific sub-
jects" to find fingerprints admissible); State v. Knight, 43 Me. 11 (1857) (court admitted
blood type evidence on basis of experimental evidence of reliability). But "the notion of a
special rule of admissibility for scientific evidence seems to have arisen [with Frye] in 1923."
MCCORMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 203, at 489 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
Later accounts indicate that the defendant in Frye was induced to confess to a murder
by a "friend," who promised the defendant a half share in the $1,000 reward money of-
fered by the victim's family. See R. FERGUSON & A. MILLER, POLYGRAPH FOR THE DEFENSE
5-6 (1974). Lie-detector tests corroborated the defendant's story. Id. at 6. Although his
lawyers were unable to enter the favorable test results, they did get the fact that the
defendant had passed the test before the jury, possibly persuading the jury to forego the
death penalty. Id. at 6-7. The test results were later substantiated by the real murderer's
confession. See FOURTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE STATE OF
NEW YORK 265 (1948).
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able." Second, the higher standard protects the interests of de-
fendants, who frequently are unable to effectively rebut such evi-
dence. 1
All courts require that a new scientific technique be reliable
enough to have some probative value-that it operate on more
than principles of sheer chance. But courts that apply the Frye
standard demand that the new technique have an even higher
level of reliability because they are concerned that the "mystic in-
fallibility" of scientific devices will unduly sway lay jurors.1 2 Courts
that have adopted the Frye standard believe that general scientific
acceptance is the best assurance that the new technique's results
are reliable. These courts often portray the Frye standard in terms
of a dual trial for the new technique, in which scientists "form a
kind of technical jury, which must first pass on the scientific status
of a procedure before the lay jury utilizes it in making its findings
of fact." 13 In addition, some of the courts applying the Frye
standard maintain that the standard guarantees the availability of
a pool of experts to help a defendant challenge the new
technique's admissibility.'
4
10 See, e.g., United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974); People v.
Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 31, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 148, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244 (1976); State v.
Williams, 388 A.2d 500, 506 (Me. 1978) (Nichols, J., concurring in the result); Reed v.
State, 283 Md. 374, 385-89, 391 A.2d 364, 369-72 (1978); People v. Barbara, 400 Mich. 352,
405, 255 N.W.2d 171, 194 (1977).
"1 See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 556 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 385-89, 391 A.2d
364, 369-72 (1978); Commonwealth v. Topa, 471 Pa. 223, 232, 369 A.2d 1277, 1282
(1977).
'2 See, e.g., United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974); People v.
Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 31, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 149, 549 P.2d 1240, 1245 (1976). One court
suggested that recent dramatic scientific successes in space exploration, contrasted with
human failures such as Watergate, have increased the danger of juror belief in "the infalli-
bility of science." See D'Arc v. D'Arc, 157 N.J. Super. 553, 565, 385 A.2d 278, 284 (1978).
Courts voice this concern regardless of which side in a criminal trial seeks to use scientific
evidence. Frye, after all, sought to use the test results in his own defense.
13 People v. Barbara, 400 Mich. 352, 405, 255 N.W.2d 171, 194 (1977). See United
States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743-44 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (scientists "most qualified" to
assess technique's validity and "have the determinative voice"); People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d
24, 31, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 148, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244 (1976) (Frye assigns reliability ques-
tion to scientists "rather than turning to the trial judge"); State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500,
506 (Me. 1978) (Nichols, J., concurring in the result) (new techniques should first face
review by scientific peers).
14 See United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974). This protective
function of the Frye standard has frequently been vitiated by some courts' failure to apply
Frye's language rigorously. Courts have construed the appropriate "community" of scien-
tists too narrowly, sometimes accepting a mere handful of experts as a "community." One
court defined "community" as those scientists who would be expected to be familiar with
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Although United States v. Williams 15 was not the first case to
adopt some form of balancing test for the admissibility of new
scientific evidence,' it was among the first to explicitly discard
Frye in favor of a test modeled after Federal Rule of Evidence
403.11 Federal courts have generally found that the Federal
Rules of Evidence were not intended to supersede the Frye stan-
dard. " Since the rules took effect, four circuit courts have reaf-
the voiceprint technique under consideration. It thus limited its survey to a small group of
scientists, primarily pioneers in voiceprint research and development. Commonwealth v.
Lykus, 367 Mass. 191, -, 327 N.E.2d 671, 677-78 (1975). Another court admitted the
results of a chemical test for narcotics use even though the general medical profession was
unfamiliar with the test and its "general acceptance" was "limited to those few in a
specialized field who deal with the narcotics problem." People v. Williams, 164 Cal. App.
2d 858, 862, 331 P.2d 251, 253-54 (1958). Delineating such a small group of experts as a
"community" limits the defendant's access to experts who will challenge the technique.
Other courts, anxious to utilize the newest scientific techniques and impatient with the
deliberations of the scientific community, stretch the concept of "general" acceptance to
embrace techniques that are embroiled in raging controversy. One court argued that
"[elvery useful new development must have its first day in court," despite the "conflicting
opinions of... legions of expert witnesses." United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 438 (6th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971).
Most serious of all, many courts permit general acceptance to be assessed by propo-
nents of the new technique. For a critical discussion of the role of one of the voiceprint's
early experts as a developer and promoter of the technique and as a witness for its
admissibility in court, see People v. King, 266 Cal. App. 2d 437, 450-59, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478,
487-92 (1968). All three problems can be eased if courts insist that an independent expert,
not one whose career is inextricably intertwined with the success of the new technique,
assess its acceptance. See text accompanying notes 49-51 infra. Some courts have been
adamant in insisting upon such independent testimony. See, e.g., People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d
24, 38, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 153, 549 P.2d 1240, 1249 (1976) (rejecting assessment by voice-
print expert who helped develop and promote process); People v. Tobey, 401 Mich. 141,
146, 257 N.W.2d 537, 539 (1977) (rejecting similar assessment by experts
"whose reputations and careers have been built on their voiceprint work").
'5 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1025 (1979).
16 See, e.g., United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019
(1975) (court should weigh prejudicial impact of relevant technical evidence; does not re-
ject Frye); United States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25, 33 n.12 (6th Cir.) (trial judge's finding of
reliability deemed equivalent of general scientific acceptance), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042
(1975).
1" The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, in State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500 (Me.
1978), held that the Frye standard should give way to Maine Rule of Evidence 403, which is
based on Federal Rule of Evidence 403. The court allowed "the presiding Justice ... a
latitude, which the Fye rule denies, to hold admissible in a particular case proffered evi-
dence involving newly ascertained, or applied, scientific principles which have not yet
achieved general acceptance in whatever might be thought to be the applicable scientific
community, if a showing has been made which satisfies the Justice that the proffered evi-
dence is sufficiently reliable to be held relevant." Id. at 504.
18 The Federal Rules of Evidence do not deal explicitly with evidence derived from
new scientific techniques. Rule 702, dealing with expert witnesses, provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the irier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qual-
ified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may
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firmed the Frye standard. 19 Of these four courts, only one re-
ferred explicitly to any clash between the rules and the general
acceptance standard. The Sixth Circuit found that the liberal
policies of the rules needed the restraint of the Frye standard to
ensure fair trials for criminal defendants.
2 0
The Second Circuit, in United States v. Williams, upheld the
use of "voiceprint"'21 evidence in a narcotics trial and flatly re-
jected the notion that courts should require general acceptance by
the scientific community."" The court bristled at the concept of a
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
FED. R. EVID. 702. The Federal Rules do, however, provide for the exclusion of some
otherwise relevant evidence:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
FED. R. Evio. 403. See note 20 and accompanying text infra for further discussion of the
rules.
'9 See United States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508, 510 (9th Cir. 1978) ("forward looking
infrared system" to identify airplane fails Frye test); United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541,
554-59 (6th Cir. 1977) (microprobic hair analysis not admissible under Frye); United States
v. McDaniel, 538 F.2d 408, 412-13 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (voiceprint evidence fails Frye test);
United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1975) (results of polygraph tests not
admissible under Frye).
20 United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 556 (6th Cir. 1977). The Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals noted that the "dear trend in federal court is toward the admission of expert
testimony whenever it will aid the trier of fact.... However, a strong countervailing re-
straint on the admission of expert testimony is the defendant's right to a fair trial." Id. The
Federal Rules themselves are inconclusive on the subject and the Advisory Committee
Notes make no mention of Frye. Congress enacted Article VII, dealing with expert tes-
timony, without significantly altering the proposed article forwarded by the Supreme
Court. See RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR UNITED STATES COURTS AND MAGISTRATES, 56 F.R.D.
183, 281-92 (1972) (Text of Article VII as forwarded by Supreme Court). Congressional
attention focused on provisions such as rule 706, dealing with the appointment of experts
by the court, and did not consider the article's effect on the treatment of new scientific
techniques. The House, Senate, and House Conference reports did not even mention Arti-
cle VII. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 7075; S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 7051; H.R. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 7098.
21 The voice spectrogram, or voiceprint, depicts the duration, frequency, and
amplitude of a voice's sound waves as a series of lines of varying shades of darkness on a
graph. The operator compares certain key passages from a sample and an unknown tape.
The developers of the technique maintain that because no two persons possess exactly the
same vocal cavities or speech patterns, no two spectrograms will be the same. For a
thorough discussion of the development of the technique, see A. MOENSSENS & F. INBAU,
supra note 1, at 564-84.
22 583 F.2d at 1198. The prosecution introduced voiceprints to establish defendant
Isiah Williams as the telephone caller who arranged a drug transaction. The trial court
found that voiceprint evidence was admissible under the Frye standard. United States v.
Williams, 443 F. Supp. 269, 270-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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"technical jury," declaring that trial courts should not "surrender
to scientists the responsibility for determining the reliability" of
evidence. 23 Although the court did not mention Federal Rule of
Evidence 403,24 it paraphrased the rule, stating that the trial court
should weigh against the evidence's probative value and reliability
"any tendency to mislead, prejudice, or confuse the jury."25  In
addition, the court noted that rule 702 permitted qualified expert
witnesses to testify if the judge finds it "will assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." 26
Within this scheme, the court declared, the Frye standard has no
place.
The Second Circuit outlined several factors for trial courts to
consider in assessing the reliability of a new scientific technique:
the technique's potential rate of error,'2 7 the existence and
maintenance of testing standards, 2 the care with which the
technique has been employed,2 9 the technique's similarity to other




The Second Circuit's criticisni of the Frye standard could be
more fairly addressed to the often mechanical application of the
standard by Frye's progeny. These courts have shown excessive
deference to a far smaller "community" of experts-a technical
jury drawn from a limited pool-than that contemplated by the
standard. 32 The technical jury description of the general accep-
tance requirement, attacked in United States v. Williams,33 is color-
23 583 F.2d at 1198.
21 Quoted in note 18 supra.
25 583 F.2d at 1198.
26 Id. at 1200 n. 11. FED. R. EvID. 702 is quoted in note 18 supra.
27 583 F.2d at 1198. The court cited evidence that the error rate for spectrographic
voice analysis, or voiceprints, was as low as 2.4%. Id.
28 Id. In the case of spectrographic voice analysis, the court noted, the International
Association of Voice Identification, "an organization concerned with training and certifica-
tion of spectrograph examiners and with procedures," had issued guidelines for proper use
of the technique. Id.
29 Id. at 1199.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 See note 14 supra.
"2 See text accompanying notes 22-23 supra.
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ful and catchy, but it is nonsense. It is dangerous nonsense be-
cause it creates a spurious reason for rejecting Frye.34  Under a
proper application of the Frye standard, the trial judge retains
complete control over the admission of evidence. The judge de-
cides whether the new scientific technique has achieved general
acceptance in the appropriate scientific field, and the breadth of
such terms as "general" give him considerable leeway.
35'
The technical jury issue obscures the real difference between
the Frye and United States v. Williams approaches. The Second Cir-
cuit's position requires the trial judge to balance the probative
value and reliability of the proposed evidence against its potential
for misleading or prejudicing the jury.3" Frye sets up an inde-
pendent standard for guaranteeing the reliability of the new sci-
entific technique; it does not explicitly deal with the impact of the
new evidence on the jury. This apparent omission upset the Sec-
ond Circuit. By its silence, Frye appears to assign to scientists the
task of assessing the technique's potential for misleading the
jury-a task for which the scientists are wholly unequipped.
Contrary to appearances, however, courts applying the Frye
standard have not neglected the impact of proposed scientific evi-
dence on the jury. These courts assume that unfamiliar scientific
techniques and devices will strongly impress jurors. 37  If the evi-
dence is not as accurate as the jury assumes it to be, the jury is
misled. Frye's threshold requirement of general scientific accep-
tance is an attempt to guarantee that any scientific evidence reach-
ing a jury will be as reliable as the jury believes it to be. Any
evidence derived from a technique which has not achieved gen-
eral acceptance from the appropriate scientific community is per
se misleading, and therefore inadmissible.
This per se rule seems unappealingly inflexible next to the
balancing test espoused by United States v. Williams.38  Nonethe-
14 See, e.g., State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500, 504 (Me. 1978) (under Frye rule, "the
presiding Justice is bound by an additional, independently controlling standard") (emphasis in
original).
" Some courts have abused this judicial latitude. See note 14 supra.
36 583 F.2d at 1198.
17 See, e.g., United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("scientific
proof may in some instances assume a posture of mystic infallibility in the eyes of a jury of
laymen"); People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 31, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 149, 549 P.2d 1240, 1245
(1976) ("[lhay jurors tend to give considerable weight to 'scientific' evidence when presented
by 'experts' with impressive credentials").
38 One leading commentator on the law of evidence maintains that:
"General scientific acceptance" is a proper condition for taking judicial notice of
1979]
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less, on a practical level Frye is correct. Judges assess the poten-
tially misleading impact of evidence derived from new scientific
techniques with great difficulty. The impact of scientific test re-
sults on a jury is a matter of fine degree and is less susceptible to
measurement than the prejudicial impact of most proffered evi-
dence. The judge is not deciding whether a color photograph of
an accident victim's mangled body or a murder victim's bloody
clothing would unduly prejudice or mislead a jury. In those cases,
a judge can call upon his past experiences with the passions and
foibles of juries, as well as his own feelings, to assess the probable
impact of the evidence. But if the evidence is derived from new
scientific techniques, the judge must predict what level of accuracy
the jury will ascribe to the technique, and then decide whether the
technique will meet the jury's probable expectations.39
United States v. Williams provides the judge with no means to
measure the difference between the device's reliability and the
degree of credence the jury will give it. Rather, the Second Circuit
assumed that cross-examination and opposing experts will lower
the jury's expectations to reflect the device's true reliability. The
court's reliance on the jury's power to find new scientific
techniques unreliable or misleading 40 illustrates its confusion. It
makes no sense to say that a jury has the power to decide whether
it is being misled: if the jury is being misled, it will not know it.
Even if it is not misled, a jury is likely to give undue weight,
in some cases, to the results of an "objective" scientific test. When
the prosecution uses evidence such as voiceprints, the technical
data is often only part of the prosecution's presentation. 41 A jury
scientific facts, but not a criterion for the admissibility of scientific evidence.
Any relevant conclusions which are supported by a qualified expert witness
should be received unless there are other reasons for exclusion. Particularly,
probative value may be overborne by the familiar dangers of prejudicing or
misleading the jury, and undue consumption of time.
MCCORMICK, supra note 9, § 203, at 491 (footnotes omitted).
" The judge's task is further complicated by the fact that he must make his decision
before the evidence is presented at trial; he has no way of knowing how effectively the
opponent will counter the evidence.
40 583 F.2d at 1200.
4' See, e.g., United States v. McDaniel, 538 F.2d 408, 411-12 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (prosecu-
tion presented testimony of co-conspirators in gambling operation and policemen whom de-
fendant bribed, as well as voiceprint evidence); United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463, 464
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975) (telephone company trace of threatening call to
defendant's home presented in addition to voiceprint evidence); United States v. Stifel, 433
F.2d 431, 432-35 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971) (in addition to neutron
activation analysis test of bomb fragments, prosecution introduced threatening letters writ-
[Vol. 64:875
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that has heard other evidence against the defendant, but is reluc-
tant to convict because of doubts about his guilt, may transfer its
feelings of responsibility for a conviction to the purportedly objec-
tive test results.
United States v. Williams also ignores the other major concern
of courts that apply the Frye standard-the defendant's access to
experts. The Second Circuit would apparently be satisfied if the
developer and sole expert in the use of a new technique could
convince a trial judge that the technique was reliable.42  The Frye
standard, by requiring general scientific acceptance, guarantees
that a new technique will be familiar to a significant segment of
the appropriate scientific community. 43 This, in turn, guarantees
that a defendant will have a pool of experts from which to seek
rebuttal witnesses. Even when a technique is so widely accepted by
scientists that no reputable expert would challenge its basic prin-
ciples, the defendant will still be likely to find experts willing to
challenge its application. A number of "voiceprint" experts, for
instance, accept the basic principles on which the technique oper-
ates, but question its application in untested areas.44
Even if a pool of experts exists, a criminal defendant may
have trouble utilizing these witnesses. Courts applying Frye have
frequently noted that most criminal defendants are in a poor posi-
ten by defendant, newspaper clippings of fatal bombing found in defendant's closet, and
other circumstantial evidence); Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 376, 391 A.2d 364, 365 (1978)
(defendant arrested as he approached locker containing money extorted from rape victim,
in addition to voiceprint analysis of extortionist's telephone calls); Commonwealth v. Lykus,
367 Mass. 191, -, 327 N.E.2d 671, 672-73 (1975) (prosecution introduced, in addition to
voiceprint results, fact that defendant was seen near murder scene, was arrested after pick-
ing up kidnap ransom money, and had pistol in his apartment similar to murder weapon).
42 In assessing the reliability of voiceprints, the Second Circuit did not focus on other
scientists' views of spectrographic experiments, but instead looked directly at the results
achieved by one voiceprint expert. 583 F.2d at 1198. The court noted that a new technique
may be admissible even if it does not meet all of the criteria for reliability. Id. at 1200 n.12.
None of the criteria deal with the availability of other experts for rebuttal purposes.
43 By requiring general acceptance by the appropriate scientific community, as opposed
to mere acquiescence or indifference, the Frye test implicitly requires that there have been
a debate over the new technique, or at least wide dissemination of information about it
within that community.
4' See United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744-45 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (court notes
experts' misgivings about reliability of voiceprints outside of controlled laboratory condi-
tions; finds voiceprints inadmissible); People v. Law, 40 Cal. App. 3d 69, 84, 114 Cal. Rptr.
708, 718 (1974) (court notes experts' reservations about use of spectrographic analysis to
identify disguised voices, on which there was no experimental data; finds voiceprints inad-
missible).
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tion to wage a "battle of the experts." 4 5 The defendant is fre-
quently unable to pay for expert witnesses. 4" Even if a court is
authorized to appoint expert witnesses for the defendant, 4 7 the
expense may make courts reluctant to provide such aid unless the
crime charged is extremely serious. If the defendant presents no
rebuttal testimony, the technical evidence will probably enter with
no more than an uninformed challenge from the defendant's at-
torney. Under the Frye standard, however, the prosecution must
first make a showing of general acceptance, 48 and the defense at-
torney then faces the less arduous task of challenging the accep-
tance of the technique, rather than the reliability of the new
technique itself.
Faulty application of the Frye standard by some courts 49 does
not argue for its rejection. Rather, courts should adjust their pro-
cedures to preserve the fairness of criminal trials when scientific
evidence is proffered. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence and
many parallel state rules, courts have the authority to summon
their own experts. 50 This expert need not hav a developer's
knowledge of the technique's inner workings, for he is assessing
the technique's reception among scientists, not its reliability. The
4' See United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 441 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
994 (1971) (use of scientific evidence by prosecution "can be subjected to abuse" and cdurts
should make sure defendant is given adequate time and resources to respond); State v.
Williams, 388 A.2d 500, 506 (Me. 1978) (Nichols, J., concurring in the result) (the "burden
of rebuttal is generally borne in these criminal cases by defendants without the economic
means to marshal scientific witnesses for a battle of the experts").
A 1966 study noted the "imbalance between prosecution and defense" in the use of
experts. In 22% of the cases surveyed the prosecution presented expert testimony and the
defense presented none. In 3% of the cases both sides put experts on the stand, and in
only 3% of the cases did the defense alone present expert testimony. In the remaining 72%
of the trials neither side presented expert testimony. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMEP-
CAN JURY 139 (1971).
4' This concern prompted one court to caution that "if the government sees fit to use
this time consuming, expensive means of fact-finding, it must both allow time for a
defendant to make similar tests, and in the instance of an indigent defendant, a means to
provide for payment for same." United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 441 (6th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971).
47 Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, courts are authorized to appoint their own
independent experts, as well as experts suggested by the parties. FED. R. EVID. 706.
48 At the preliminary hearing, the proponent of the technical evidence must dem-
onstrate general acceptance by the appropriate scientific community. This is necessary to
gain the admission of the evidence, regardless of what the opposing party does. If the
court insists upon obtaining an objective assessment of the relevant scientific opinion on its
own, the defendant's rights will frequently be protected even though he calls no expert
witnesses. See note 14 supra.
49 See note 14 supra.
50 See note 47 supra.
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expert need only understand the principles upon which the
technique is based and have expertise in the fields utilizing those
principles. In addition, courts may refer to statements of adminis-
trative commissions or other scientific bodies which take positions
on the use of scientific techniques. 51  By insisting on such assess-
ments, courts will obtain an objective interpretation of the term
"9general acceptance" to supplement the parties' interested evalua-
tions. Independent experts also increase the likelihood that the
relevant scientific community will include experts other than those
intimately connected with the development and promotion of the
new technique.
CONCLUSION
Criminal courts should retain the Frye standard for the ad-
mission of evidence derived by new scientific techniques. Frye's as-
sumption that such evidence will always have a strong impact on
the jury is less elegant theoretically than the balancing test used in
United States v. Williams. The balancing act required by the Second
Circuit, however, is impractical for the judge to perform and the
chances for error are great. The Frye standard, by requiring a
higher level of acceptance than the balancing test, is a better
guarantee that any scientific evidence reaching a jury will be as
reliable as the jury believes it to be. The Frye test, if applied con-
scientiously, also assures the defendant greater access to rebuttal
experts and makes the "battle of the experts" less uneven. Until
other methods are developed to redress the imbalance in re-
sources between prosecution and defense, courts should continue
to apply the Frye standard.
Philip Hiatt Dixon
51 For example, the National Academy of Sciences recently warned that the use of
voiceprint evidence in court proceedings should be approached with great caution. The
Academy undertook a study of the technique at the request of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1979, § A, at 13, col. 3.
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